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Introduction
The controversial welfare eects of parallel trade in pharmaceutical markets have been critically debated in health economics and policy (e.g., Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004; Dutta, 2011) . The core of this policy debate is the tension between achieving price reductions that directly or indirectly benet consumers in the short-run and long-run incentivising innovation into new products as well as securing the safety of drugs.
Since most drug manufacturers are active in international markets, both production and R&D activities are typically carried out at the global level. Yet, intellectual property rights (IPR) on active substances are generally exhausted at the national level, which creates entry barriers across geographical (national) markets. These barriers try to eliminate arbitrage gains, which would be possible in pharmaceuticals since the prices for the same drugs dier across countries as a response to heterogeneous national demand and income conditions and as a reaction to dierent national regulations (Kyle, 2011) .
In this context, parallel imports i.e., a drug made or sold legally in other countries, which is imported without the permission of the intellectual property right-holder (e.g., the patent owner) by licensed trading rms are expected to generate some downward pressure on price levels. In theory, the welfare eects of parallel trade are ambiguous and depend on the dierences in the national price regulations (Bennato and Valletti, 2014; Jelovac and Bordoy, 2005) , the patients' preferences (Jelovac and Bordoy, 2005) and the vertical integration of the trade rms (Ganslandt and Maskus, 2007) among other reasons. If the cross-country price dierentials do not reect true discrepancies in the eciency of production and they are rather the outcome of dierent regulatory policies, parallel imports may lead to a price convergence that constitutes a mere welfare transfer from consumers in low-price countries to consumers in high-price countries and most likely benets arbitrageurs (Danzon, 1998) . Furthermore, the loss in prots for patent holders may lead to decreased R&D investments (Rey, 2003) . However, even from a theoretical point of view, these mechanisms are not unequivocally clear. Parallel imports might well have positive eects on the innovation intensity due to the dierent incentives rms and regulators face when IPRs are internationally rather than nationally exhausted (e.g., Bennato and Valletti, 2014; Grossman and Lai, 2008) . Hence, the assessment of the welfare eects of parallel trade is essentially an empirical issue. To identify causal eects, however, it is necessary to observe situations where parallel trade is allowed.
To this aim, the process of European integration provides a great policy experiment. The European Court of Justice commonly supports the communitywide exhaustion of IPR which allows free trade within the EU and prohibits the trade of patented products from and to non-European countries. 1 Indeed, drug trade mostly emerges from low-price countries such as Portugal, Spain, and Greece to high-price countries such as the UK, Sweden, and Germany (Kyle, 2011; Grossman and Lai, 2008) . In 2012, parallel trade amounted to about e5.3bn in the EU and to e2.9bn (based on ex-factory prices) in Germany (Murray and Weissenfeldt, 2013). The total market shares of parallel imports ranged 1 Parallel imported products are generally allowed in Europe and only dier in terms of packaging or colour, as the trading rms have to add package inserts and provide labelling in German either by a new package or by a sticker overlay. As an example, see Figures 1 and 2. in 2010 from 24% in Denmark, to 11% in Germany, 10% in the Netherlands, and 7% in the UK (EFPIA, 2013). In the market for patented drugs, parallel imports covered 25% of the sales in Germany in 2010 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010 ), whereby Germany is by far the largest European market for pharmaceuticals and the heaviest parallel importer in the EU (Murray and Weissenfeldt, 2013 ).
Our paper aims at adding to this controversial discussion by analysing the eect of parallel trade in the German anti-diabetics market. We estimate a structural model of demand and supply for a large panel data set containing all oral anti-diabetic drugs sold between 2004 and 2010. We focus on this indication for four reasons: First, changes in demographics and lifestyles made diabetes type 2 one of the most widespread diseases in Western countries. For instance, between 2000 and 2009 the number of German diabetes patients increased by 49% (Köster, Schubert, and Huppertz, 2012) . Second, we observe the coexistence of original drugs, generics, and parallel imports across the dierent active substances. Third, oral anti-diabetics are prescribed exclusively for the treatment of this single disease, which makes a denition of the potential market size easier to identify. Finally, the prescription procedure for a particular drug package can be modelled more easily in this market than in other pharmaceutical markets.
The data that we use are provided by IMS Health and entail monthly information on sales, ex-factory prices, and further product characteristics such as package size, producer and re-seller names, and market entry. We model demand through a two-stage nested logit approach (e.g., Berry, 1994; Verboven, 1996; Stern, 1996) , where the upper-nest corresponds to the chemical group (ATC4) and the lower-nest corresponds to the active substance (ATC5). This two-level structure based on the chemical groups and active substance covers the most relevant aspects of patient heterogeneity as well as the most relevant decisions' criteria of the physicians and the patients.
We build on Björnerstedt and Verboven (2012) and expand their approach to the estimation of dierent price coecients for dierent chemical groups (Slade, 2004 ).
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While own price elasticities vary across chemical groups and active substances as well as over time, we estimate a mean own-price elasticity of -6.6 and mean cross-price elasticities that range from 5.082 to 0.002. Based on an oligopolistic model of multi-product rms, we then recover the marginal costs and, accordingly, relative markups on prices, which range between 22% and 86% depending on the specic drug type. Using these estimated demand-and supply-side parameters, we then simulate the new equilibrium prices, market shares, and changes in demand-side surplus and producers' variable prots that would result absent parallel trade.
3 According to our estimates, parallel imports strongly decrease the average price of patented drugs by 11% while they only imply a limited increase by 0.7% for the price of generic drugs that are sub-2 For a general discussion on the benets of alternative modelling alternatives for discrete choice models of demand see also Grigolon and Verboven (2014) . However, Björnerstedt and Verboven (2012) conclude that even in the specically regulated pharmaceutical industry the nested logit model seems to be strongly supported for use in competition analysis. ject to intense competition also without parallel imports. The overall increase in demand-side welfare due to parallel trade is estimated to be e130 million over seven years, which amounts to an increase by around 4% of the total demand side surplus calculated in the market for oral anti-diabetics absent parallel trade. The corresponding decrease in variable prots in Germany due to parallel trade for the manufacturers of original drugs amounts to e125 million over the seven sample years. 4 Parallel importers only appropriate a small fraction (e41 million) of this rent.
Our study contributes to the growing empirical literature on the eects of parallel imports on prices and welfare, whose results are still controversial.
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While some of these studies nd that parallel trade achieves only limited price reductions (e.g., Ganslandt Hence, to make a more precise assessment of the welfare implications of dierent policy interventions, our approach builds on recent developments in the empirical health economic literature that estimates structural models of demand and supply. The most recent studies in this strand of literature analyse the market entry of generic and me-too drugs in the U.S. (Ching, 2010;  Branstetter, Chatterjee, and Higgins, 2011; Arcidiacono, Ellickson, Landry, and Ridley, 2012; Bokhari and Fournier, 2013) . Almost all these papers show that the entry of generic drugs benets consumers more than it harms the producers by decreasing prices of the former patented drug. Furthermore, there seems to exist substitutability not only across brand-names and generics or me-toos of the same molecule but also among dierent molecules (Branstetter, Chatterjee, and Higgins, 2011; Bokhari and Fournier, 2013) . Since parallel imports are not allowed and patented drugs' prices are relatively high in the U.S., comparisons to Europe are dicult.
Probably the papers closest to our study are those by Dutta (2011) and Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2006) . They model the eects of stricter intellectual property rights on welfare in India. Both measure substantial loss in consumer welfare from patent enforcement and price deregulation but quite limited gains for foreign patent holders. These results cannot be transferred directly to the European case since in the EU patent enforcement is so strict that 4 This number must be taken cautiously since our data does not contain information on cheaper copies from other producers are not available in markets for patented drugs. Instead, parallel imports of the original drug from low-price to high-price countries exist. Hence, our research adds to this growing literature by looking for the rst time at the welfare eect of parallel trade in the largest European market for oral anti-diabetics. Furthermore, it constitutes the rst attempt to estimate a structural demand model for the German pharmaceutical market.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional details of the regulations in the German drug markets and the characteristics of the market for oral anti-diabetics. Section 3 describes our data, while Section 4 sets up our modelling strategy. Section 5 presents the results of our estimation and simulation. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the results and their policy implications.
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Diabetes and the German market for oral antidiabetic drugs
Diabetes is a metabolic chronic disease in which either the body does not produce enough insulin (type 1 diabetes) or it does not respond to the insulin that is produced (type 2 diabetes). Usually, the disease results in hyperglycaemia, or high blood sugar, and leads to damages of the body's systems, e.g., nerves
and blood vessels (WHO, 2013).
The causes of type 1 diabetes are unknown and the disease is unpreventable.
The treatment includes medication with insulin. We focus on type 2 diabetes which accounts for 90% of all patients with diabetes (WHO, 2013). Type 2 diabetes diers substantially from type 1 diabetes and its causes include obesity, tobacco use, and physical inactivity. In Germany, 6 to 7 million patients are estimated to have suered from type 2 diabetes in 2010 and a large number of unknown cases is assumed. Thus, diabetes type 2 is estimated to aect around 8% of the German population (Rathmann and Tamayo, 2012).
The German market for oral anti-diabetic drugs is large. In 2010, it amounted to about e572 million in pharmacy selling prices and e249 millions in ex-factory prices (own calculations). The treatment of type 2 diabetes ranges from dietary nutrition and physical activity to oral anti-diabetic drugs and, in severe cases, insulin. Seven chemical groups of oral anti-diabetics were available between 2004 and 2010 comprising 22 active substances. The drugs either suppress glucose production by the liver (biguanide ), delay glucose absorption of the blood (alpha-glucosidase inhibitors), stimulate the production of insulin (sulfonylureas, glinides), increase the physiological function of insulin (thiazolidinediones ), or decreases blood glucose levels indirectly by increasing incretin levels (Dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP-4) inhibitors). Furthermore, a range of drugs that combine groups of active substances (so-called combinations, e.g., biguanide and thiazolidinediones) were also available in the market. Each chemical group comprises several active substances that can be divided into either o-patent markets with free access for generic products or markets for patented drugs with strictly regulated access. However, independently of the specic regulation of reimbursement and disposal, all rms are free to set prices.
Cost-sharing and the distribution of parallel imports
More than 85% of the German population around 69.8 million people are covered by the statutory health insurance system (BMG, 2013). We only consider this group in our analysis. These insureds face a co-payment of 10% per package (minimum e5, maximum e10) on pharmaceutical prices for prescription drugs, In Germany, the distribution of parallel imports is supported by the regulator. Pharmacists need to full a specic quota: the share of total turnover gained by parallel imports per patented active substance has to exceed 5% (BMG, 2013).
7 Furthermore, the parallel imported drug's price has to be at least 15% or e15 below the original product's package price to be considered as a parallel imported drug in the 5% quota. However, in our data, these thresholds are only met by a small fraction of parallel imports and we observe both prices below and above them. 
8
In this sense, the demand-side of our model is a reduced form of a more complex decision making structure. We approximate this process by using a two-level nested logit model described below.
Demand Model
We observe one geographical market (Germany) over t = 1, ..., 84 months from 2004 to 2010. For each month, we calculate the potential market size, M t , as the number of dened daily doses (DDD) for all diabetes patients in Germany.
The potential market size is about twice as large as the actual market due to patients that either choose a non-prescription drug or other therapies to treat type 2 diabetes. The following specication of the demand estimation closely follows previous work from Berry (1994) ; Verboven (1996) , and Slade (2004).
7 Additionally, this must hold for each health insurance and quarter. 8 Potentially, pharmacists and health insurers also are involved in this decision process, yet their inuence in the determination of the demand for specic drugs is expected to be limited.
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Joint utility maximization
The I agents, i = 1, ..., I, in each market/month t choose one out of J t products, j = 1, ..., J t . 9 In our setting, the agent's choice is represented by the joint decision of the two stakeholders: the patient and the physician.
The patient rst provides information on her health status and, after discussing with the physician the most suitable chemical group and active substance, she nally chooses which specic product and package to buy at the pharmacy. We expect patients to show price-sensitive behaviour and have a preference for drugs that are fully exempt from co-payments. We also assume that patients respond to prices, as co-payments are a monotonic transformation of them, but to a smaller extent than doctors given the nature of the regulatory system and the limited amount of the co-payments.
The doctor is assumed to mostly decide in the patient's interest with respect to medical needs and other preferences, such as price sensitivity or taste.
However, physicians are also assumed to purse their own utility as they are encouraged to consider economic aspects in their prescription behaviour even though they are not directly punished or compensated based on their decisions.
Only if physicians exceed their individual drug budgets do they have to justify it to their supervising organization. Still, they should prefer to prescribe less expensive drugs such as generics (if available) to avoid audits and ease their overall budget constraint.
The model incorporates the option that agents might decide not to buy any drug or/and another product. This so-called outside good j = 0 extends the choice set to J t + 1 products. The agent i's conditional indirect utility function for drug j is assumed to be:
where p jt is the price of product j in time/market t, and x jt is the vector of other observed product characteristics, such as the active substance, the strength, or the package size. Among these other characteristics, we also consider whether the drug is exempt from co-payments. This should capture an important aspect of the patients' decision, i.e. the preference not to pay to get a drug. We use a more exible specication compared to the standard nestedlogit model and allow the price coecients α g to depend on the characteristics of the product, namely on the chemical groups g = 1, ..., G (Slade, 2004 ). 10
The rst reason for this modelling assumption is that we assume preferences on 9 Discrete choice models such as the nested-logit do not allow modelling of complementary goods. In our context, this might be problematic since a mix of drugs is sometimes prescribed.
However, we specically consider a chemical group which contains drugs combining dierent groups of active substances. We are therefore able to ease the complementarity problems by dening bundles of drugs which can be seen as substitutes to single drugs entailed in other nests.
10 In a robustness check, we additionally insert the co-payments into this utility function to try to better disentangle the physician's and the patient's utilities. Yet, this is problematic from a theoretical viewpoint. Moreover, it would induce multicollinearity problems in almost all ATC4 groups. In the only sensible specication, where we do not estimate group-specic price and co-payment coecients and after controlling for full co-payment exemption, the copayment variable is not signicant while the price is. Therefore, it does seem that the demand side's price sensitivity is mostly due to the physicians' economic incentives as well as patients'
preference for full exemption. The results are available upon request.
prices and thus elasticities to dier by dierent patients' medical needs, severity of illness, medical history, age, etc. which is reected by the choice of dierent chemical groups. Second, this approach helps to ease the well-known issue in logit models that elasticities and thus markups and marginal costs c depend on products' prices in a linear fashion (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995;
Nevo, 2000).
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The vector ξ j t contains characteristics that are observed by the rms, the patients, and the physicians but are unobserved by the researcher and might include brand perception, marketing expenditures, or publicly unknown interactions with other drugs. The random utility terms υ ijt reect the inuence of individual-specic taste. We assume that each agent maximises utility, u ijt , given the characteristics of the product. The mean utility of product j in time/market t is:
(2) and the mean utility of the outside good j = 0 in each time/market is normalised to zero: δ 0t = 0.
Nesting structure
In the market for oral anti-diabetics, there is a natural order of choices, which we exploit in our nesting structure. First, the physician chooses the chemical group and second the active substance suitable to the patients' physical condition (e.g. body weight), individual preferences, medical history, co-morbidities, side-eects, and age. It is well understood that physicians make this choice in a hierarchical order with respect to both across and within chemical groups and active substances. For instance, the guidelines of the National Institute for Health Care and Excellence in the UK clearly advise initiating oral glucose control therapies for type 2 diabetes with metformin, followed by insulin secretagogues or acarbose, then other oral agents such as exenatide, and nally thiazolidinediones. When exactly the physician is expected to switch across groups depends on the patient's health status.
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Based on the specic decision structure described above, we dene hierarchical nests of products by using ATC4 as the upper nest and ATC5 as the lower nest. We believe that the nesting parameters for the groups and the subgroups cover some of the most relevant aspects of patient heterogeneity as well as the most relevant aspects of the physicians' and the patients' decisions in these markets, while the product's continuous characteristics play a less fundamental role (e.g., Grigolon and Verboven, 2014) . They are mostly captured by the product xed-eects in our setting. 13 11 The linear dependency results in larger elasticities for more expensive products, which is not consistent with economic intuition.
The rst level of nests are G dierent chemical groups, g = 1, ..., G. The second level of nests consists of H g , h = 1, ..., H g , dierent active substances within the chemical group g. The specic composition of the nests is given in Table   1 . We then apply a standard two-level nested logit model and assume a variance component error structure of the agent-specic error term, υ ijt . Following Verboven (1996) , we derive the estimation equation for each period t: 
Identication
The unobserved characteristics of product j at time t are assumed to be known to the rms, the patients, and the physicians but not to the researchers, and they are captured by ξ jt . When rms set their prices they most likely use this information, which in turn implies that prices and inner-group market shares are correlated with this structural error term. Thus, they are endogenous. To partially alleviate this problem, we assume a two-way error component model by ξ jt = ξ j + ξ t + ω jt . We then capture part of the unobserved heterogeneity by means of a large set of xed-eects: the component ξ j is captured by 700 product xed-eects and ξ t is captured by 84 time dummies similar to Nevo (2001) . The remaining error term ω jt is dened as a product-and-time-specic error term. 14 In our main specication, the identication condition is therefore
This does not seem to be a particularly restrictive assumption since it is difcult to imagine systematic sources of correlation among prices and the changes in unobserved product characteristics. Yet, in order to assess the robustness of our ndings, we adopt a second identication strategy and estimate a specication where we use rm-specic xed-eects together with product-specic, mostly time-invariant, characteristics and we instrument the German prices for drug j at time t by means of the Danish prices for the same drug in the same time period.
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This strategy also has an additional advantage. Since we use ex-factory prices, one might claim that they are measured with error due to the existence of rebate contracts among generic producers and health insurance companies.
This might in turn create endogeneity problems if the contracted rebates are systematically correlated with the temporal change in unobserved characteristics of the products (our error term). While we do not think that this should be a major problem in our case, the IV approach would nonetheless allow us to obtain consistent estimate.
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In our setting, inner group market shares are also potentially endogenous.
Hence, we use an instrumental variable approach to obtain unbiased estimates for the parameters σ 1 and σ 2 . Following Berry (1994) and Dutta (2011) we use nine standard instruments which account for the crowdedness in the product space.
17 The identifying assumption is therefore that the instruments, which are correlated with the inner-group market shares and prices through the markups, are uncorrelated with the product-specic error term.
Finally, to account for the potential serial correlation of the error terms due to the relatively high-frequency time structure of the data, we cluster the standard errors at the product-level.
Elasticities
We follow Berry (1994) and Verboven (1996) by calculating own-price elasticities and cross-price elasticities that are dierent for drugs in the same sub-nest, H g , of active substances, for drugs in the same nest, G, of chemical groups, and for drugs in dierent groups. The formulas we used to compute the elasticities can be found in the Appendix. We can compute one matrix of price elasticities for all products sold in each month. This results in 84 (J t × J t ) matrices of elasticities.
Even though the nested-logit model is restrictive in the representation of substitution patterns within or outside groups, it is quite exible when it comes to the asymmetry of cross-price elasticities across products or groups as these only depend on the structural parameters and the price and market shares of the substitute good/group. This is particularly important in our context where the substitution among dierent chemical groups is mostly hierarchical and cannot be assumed to be symmetric.
Supply Side
In our analysis, we assume that rms in pharmaceutical markets sell a range of dierentiated products and compete in prices. Typically, dierentiation in drug markets stems from the active substance, strength, package size, and branding.
In our sample 68 rms sell 700 products either in the same or in dierent classes of active substances. Hence, we assume that all these drugs (patented, imported, or generic) are, to some extent, substitutes one of the other. Indeed, our demand estimation approach enables us to recover all possible cross-price elasticities among them. Further, we use the observed ownership structure to account for the fact that multi-product rms internalise the competitive externalities that each of their products exerted on the demand of their other products.
Finally, we assume that rms compete in prices. This is the standard assumption made in the relevant literature (e.g., Dunn, 2012; Dutta, 2011) and reects the observation that pharmaceutical rms do not compete in quantities when producing chemical drugs.
18 In o-patent markets, such as metformin, market entry is a common phenomenon and demand-side regulation supports price competition, e.g., by reference pricing or co-payments. In markets for patented drugs, like the one for thiazolidinediones, the patent holder is granted a short run monopoly. However, since in our model we explicitly allow for parallel imports and model the competition patented drugs face from similar active substances, we believe that Bertrand-Nash behaviour with dierentiated goods is a reasonable approximation to describe the market for patented oral anti-diabetics.
The prot functions of the multi-product rm f (f = 1, . . . , 68) active in time/market t that manufacture a subset F f t , of the J products is:
where q jt (p t ) is the sold quantity of product j in time/market t as a function of the vector of all prices, p t , here dened as q jt (p t ) = s jt ×M t . This denition allows us to include the market share of the outside good as well as to keep the market size xed in our simulation while at the same time enabling the total quantity of products sold to increase (Nevo, 2000) . We assume constant marginal costs c jt yet we allow them to vary over time and we denote the xed costs with C f . Furthermore, we also assume that a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists and that the prices that support it are strictly positive (e.g., Nevo, 2000) .
In each time/market t, the price vector, p t , has to satisfy the following J t rstorder conditions (in matrix notation):
where q t (p t ), p t , and c t are J t × 1 vectors of quantities, price, and marginal costs, respectively. Ω F t is the rms' product ownership matrix (J t × J t ) with elements (Ω F t (j, k)) equal to 1 if product j and k are produced by the same rm in time/market t, and 0 otherwise. The (J t × J t ) matrix of rst derivatives ∆(p t ) = ∂q t (p t ) ∂p t is multiplied element-by-element with the ownership matrix.
To identify the marginal cost c t , Equation (5) can be rearranged into Clearly, the identication and the estimation of the marginal costs rely on our demand estimates and on the assumption of Bertrand-Nash competition.
Simulation
To quantify the welfare eects of parallel imports in Germany we compare the status quo market with parallel imports versus a hypothetical market without parallel imported drugs. We motivate this hypothetical situation by the fact that rms constantly try to avoid parallel trade (Kyle, 2007) , for instance by not entering low-price countries or by oering slightly dierent versions (in package size or strength) in dierent countries. Furthermore, as Desogus (2010) shows discussing the Adalat Case, quantity restrictions on intra EU trade limiting the availability of parallel imports have been interpreted as a unilateral conduct by the EU. The situation is dierent in the U.S., where re-imports are prohibited mostly because of patient's safety issues but also because they are expected to harm innovative rms. 19 Kanavos and Vandoros (2010) conclude that "Drawing on the European evidence, [. . . ] opening the US market to parallel imports will not necessarily lead to competition and enhance pharmaceutical cost containment." Nevertheless, there is an ongoing debate in the U.S. about disadvantages and advantages, for example by stopping illegal imports from Canada or Mexico.
Hence, we assume that the choice set in the counterfactual situation is dierent to that in the status quo. Specically, similar to the structural models that estimate the value of the introduction of new products (e.g., , we dene the counterfactual choice set where parallel imported drugs are excluded as J sim t = J t − I t , where I t is the number of parallel imports in time/market t. Accordingly, we dene the J sim t nested-logit demand functions as:
Similarly, the J sim rst-order conditions are:
We then determine the equilibrium simulated prices (p sim t ) and simulated quantities (q t (p sim t )) by using a Newton algorithm on Equations (7) and (8).
With the new simulated equilibrium (p sim t and q t (p sim t )) and the estimated structural parameter (δ t andσ) we calculate the demand-side surplus (e.g.,
19 Golec and Vernon (2006) show that U.S. rms are more protable, earn higher stock returns, and spend more on research and development (R&D) than manufacturers in the EU.
20 The demand-side surplus corresponds to the typical consumer surplus calculated for a nested logit model. As we mentioned above, since only a part of this surplus goes directly to the consumers, we prefer to use the notation demand-side surplus.
where D h|g,t = jt∈h|g exp δ jt 1 − σ 1 and the rms' variable prots are:
We nally compare them with the status quo welfare measures calculated by using the observed instead of the simulated prices and quantities.
Data
Our data set contains monthly sales and prices of all oral anti-diabetic drugs sold To ensure homogeneous market conditions, we only include in our sample products that are covered by the German SHI. A complete classication of the drugs analysed in this study is given in Table 1 in the Appendix. In our estimations, we only include packages with a market share within the subgroup of active substances (ATC 5) larger than 0.1%. 22 Furthermore, we exclude the chemical substance exenatide due to its sub-dermal administration (pens, 158 obs.) and 83 observations of retard tablets (belonging to gliclacides). Finally, we also exclude DPP-4 inhibators (287 observations) and the combination of one of them (sitagliptin) with metformin ( 23 Table 2 in the Appendix gives an overview of the 24,603 observations included in the nal estimation by rm type (originator drug manufacturer, parallel importer or generic manufacturer) and chemical group. We observe quite heterogeneous competitive conditions across groups as the biguanides and sulfonylurea groups face severe generic competition while the other groups are much smaller and under patent protection, so that the competitive constraints are mainly those imposed by parallel imported drugs or potential market entry by innovations. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the most important variables used in this study, including the dierent prices, the overall market shares (s jt ), the market shares of the products within the inner nest (s jt |h) as well as the market shares of the inner nests within the outer nest (s ht |g). The variables are presented by rm type. In our preferred specication we control for the patients' preference not to pay for the chosen drugs. This is captured through the dummy co-payment exemption that takes on the value of 1 if drugs are fully exempt from co-payments. This happens when their price undercuts a certain threshold, which is set at 70% of the reference price. In our sample, it only occurs in one of the ATC4 groups (sulfonylurea ).
24 Prices, sales per product, as well as market shares vary considerably across manufacturer types. In the lowest part of the table, we report the number of rms and products within groups and sub-groups, which are used to construct the instrumental variables for the inner-group market shares.
[ Table 3 about here] 5 Results [ Table 4 about here]
Demand-side Estimation
As conjectured, the mean utility positively and signicantly depends on the co-payment exemption which therefore conrms the importance to control for patients' preferences. Moreover, both coecients measuring the correlation of preferences within the two nests [σ 1 and σ 2 ] are consistent with random utility theory (0 ≤ σ 2 ≤ σ 1 ≤ 1) across all three models. They are considerably smaller after controlling for possible endogeneity, as expected. Model Firm FE.IV additionally shows that the demand signicantly increases if the drug stems from the originator manufacturer or a parallel importer as opposed to the generic manufacturer, capturing the preference for branded products. Furthermore, above average strength is negatively associated with the market share. [ Table 5 about here]
We can now use Equation (6) to retrieve the marginal costs and the corresponding markups for each of the 84 sample months. [ Table 6 about here]
The variation of margins and markups over time is also presented in Figure 3 
Simulation
The nal step of our empirical analysis consists of simulating the new equilibrium in prices and quantities that one would observe, had parallel imports not been allowed. By comparing this counterfactual scenario to the status quo prices and corresponding demand-side surplus and variable prots, we can estimate the value of parallel imports. Table 7 shows the estimated changes in prices (mean) and quantities (total) due to the existence of parallel imports over all 84 months in our sample. Prices of originator drugs decrease on average by ca. 11% and prices of generic drugs increase on average by only 0.7% due to parallel trade in the German market for oral anti-diabetics. The overall average price in the market increases by ca.
10% because of the existence of parallel imports, which are more expensive drugs with respect to generics. Hence since the entire price distribution changes, one cannot make a clear comparison with respect to the situation without parallel trade. In order to do that, we also report the average price of original drugs and generics excluding parallel imports. Clearly, this average price decreases as a consequence of increased competition. Moreover, we observe an expansion of demand by 2.7% due to the introduction of new goods through parallel trade.
Specically, the reduction of over 218 million DDD generics (-0.5%) and over 7 million DDD original drugs (-2.5%) is overcompensated by the sales of 428 million DDD of parallel imports.
[ Table 7 about here]
We then calculate the change in demand-side surplus and variable prots generated by the introduction of parallel trade, which are shown in Table 8 .
The change in demand-side surplus amounts to about e130 million in total (3.7% of the level without parallel trade) or ca. e19 million per year. These gures do not seem to be particularly large in comparison to the average annual market size of e227 million based on ex-factory prices.
[ Table 8 about here]
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The average demand-side eect comes mostly from the lower price level for original drugs, but is also strongly inuenced by the demand expansion as well as the behaviour of the marginal consumer. First, the prices of original drugs are lower and, second, some patients substitute away from original products to parallel imports, which are even cheaper. However, these positive demand-side eects are partially outset by a decrease in demand-side surplus from generics.
The price reduction for these drugs is minimal and several patients substitute away from the cheaper generic drugs to the more expensive parallel imports.
These patterns are conrmed when we look at how the change in demand-side surplus breaks down among the dierent chemical groups. 26 We also compared the mean co-payment with and without parallel trade. Since we neither observe reference prices or contracted rebates for the two ATC4 groups with generic competition nor the exemption for specic individuals, this average co-payment potentially entails some measurement error. For the entire sample, the mean co-payments are on average around 2% lower in our simulated data (e5.46) than in our observed data (e5.56). This reects the same logit as discussed above and it is driven by the fact that the price of parallel imports is higher than the price of generics. While the co-payments for generics are very similar in the two scenarios, the co-payments for original products are almost 50 EUR cents per package lower due to parallel trade.
27 Notice, however, that parallel trade most likely increase the prots of these multi-national rms due to the increased sales of their products to parallel importers in other countries.
prices. To this extent, one could try to simulate other counterfactual scenarios by changing other key parameters of the parallel imports policy such as for instance the distribution rule's threshold. These simulations exceed the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the eect of parallel trade on welfare in the German market for oral anti-diabetics. To this aim, we develop and estimate the rst structural demand model of the German pharmaceutical market. The estimated demand for anti-diabetic drugs seems to be quite elastic, with an average ownprice elasticity of -6.65. These results are mostly driven by the broad availability of generic products in various chemical groups. Indeed, several demand-side policies such as tiered co-payments and the reference pricing system support generic competition in the o-patent market. Moreover, physicians and pharmacists are also made more price-sensitive through other specic cost-containment regulations. These ndings contrast with the common wisdom that the broad insurance coverage of drug costs tends to generate quite price-inelastic behaviour (e.g., Kaiser, Mendez, Rønde, and Ullrich, 2013). The estimated cross-price elasticities support the existence of some degree of market segmentation. Substitution seems to mainly take place across drugs within the same active substance and less within the same chemical group. The fact that patients barely substitute across chemical groups is very much in line with the physicians' behaviour in oral glucose control therapies for type 2 diabetes.
The main focus of our analysis is the measurement of the welfare eect of parallel imports. We therefore need to simulate the situation where parallel imports are not allowed. By comparing the status quo to the simulated scenario we measure a price decrease of 11% for original drugs and no change for generics due to parallel trade. Several patients switch from the original products to the parallel imports, which increases demand-side surplus. Yet, this increase is limited to e130 million over the seven sample years since some patients who would consume generics in the absence of parallel imports switch to these more expensive drugs when they come to the market. Furthermore, the modest average price reaction is most likely driven by other institutional details of the existing parallel import policy in Germany (e.g., Kyle, 2011) . In particular, it might be driven by the minimum parallel import quotas of 5% in pharmacy sales. Under this regulation, pharmacists do not have any incentive to hand out cheaper parallel imports other than those which undercut the price threshold to be counted in the quota (15% or e15 below the original's price). We expect the price eect to be larger, if there were other distribution rules, e.g., if the rules were similar to those applied in the o-patent market where pharmacists have to hand out one of the three cheapest drugs if there is no rebate contract for the patient's health insurance drug combination and the physician has not ruled out a substitution of the prescribed drug. These alternative scenarios could be further investigated within our framework at the cost of imposing a more complex and potentially restrictive structure.
An important discussion that we did not address in this study is how the policy of parallel imports aect investments in research and development. This is closely related to the ability to measure prots changes for innovative manufac-turers. By denition, parallel traders gain arbitrage prots and do not conduct any investments in R&D. Thus, one eect of the policy is to transfer prots from innovative rms that invest, at least partially, into R&D toward rms that do not invest in R&D at all. Our results partially conrm this view. The manufacturers of original drugs face severe losses in the German market by over e125 million due to the introduction of parallel trade. This loss in variable prot is, however, only to a small fraction (e41 million) transferred to parallel importers and it rather benets the statutory health insurance. Yet, to get a complete picture of parallel trade's eects on manufacturers prots and incentives to innovate we would need to consider the global nature of production and R&D.
While original drugs' manufacturers lose some prots in markets with parallel trade due to increased competition, they most likely increase their prots in other markets by selling their drugs to parallel importers. Which eect prevails is unclear especially because it seems that parallel trade, by decreasing the overall price level, also has the eect to expand overall demand. Hence to carefully answer these questions, we would need a much richer model of multi-country competition and a much more extensive dataset. In the rst two columns, we report the parameter estimates for the OLS (FE) and instrumental variable (FE.IV) estimations of equation (3). The specication (FE.IV) is used for the simulation. Column (Firm FE.IV) reports the results from an IV specication with rm xed eects (without product xed eects) and where the prices p jt are instrumented with the corresponding Danish prices. The dependent variable in all specications is ls jt = ln s jt − ln s 0t , where s jt = quantity sold of drug j in month t/total market size in month t and s 0 = market share of the outside option in month t/total market size in month t. The heterogeneous price coecients α j are reported separately for the 6 dierent chemical groups (ATC4) listed in the We report the mean values and standard deviations over 84 period of the the product-level's own-(OPE) and cross-price elasticities (CPE) based on the estimated parameters from specication (FE.IV) of equation (3) and the formulas (11) to (14). 24,603 observations. 
